James Fitzgerald v. Gale Critchfield : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1986
James Fitzgerald v. Gale Critchfield : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Joseph C. Rust; Kesler & Rust; attorney for respondent.
Brian C. Harrison; attorney for respondent.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, James Fitzgerald v. Gale Critchfield, No. 860041.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1986).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/712
DOCUf. 
50 
.A10 
OOCKE II JO. 
$m>z¥ 
^hM 
I'M Till!! HUn-tUMI'l roilKT I IMIK fiTM'l'l Ol' I!'"!1,' \\\ 
JAMES FITZGERALD, 
Plaintiif-
ResponrJenh 
GALE CR1TCEFIELD, 
Detenaanc-
Appellant. 
Case |No. 20028 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
App e a J F r o III "' PI • = • E < :> \ 11 : I 1 , i, F i i cil i c :i i : "Il I ) ;ii s)::: r il • : ' 1: (": i , i : 1 : 
of the State of Utal i 
y^j • 
Attorney for Respondent 
2000 Beneficial Life Tower 
io Scat a St,.;.* v 2utMjj' 
Salt Lake C\ + \> ,h an U4111 
Tplfinhont- * n "J5-9333 
BRIAN C1. [[ARRIKON 
Attorney for Respondent 
290 West (jenter Street 
Provo, UtAh 84601 
Telepho ne| (801)3 75-2 5 0 0 
RU 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES FITZGERALD, 
Plaintiff-
Respondent 
v. 
GALE CRITCHFIELD, 
Defendant-
Appellant . 
Case No. 20028 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Appeal From The Fourth Judicial District Court 
of the State of Utah 
JOSEPH C. RUST 
KESLER & RUST 
Attorney for Respondent 
2000 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 355-9333 
BRIAN C. HARRISON 
Attorney fot Respondent 
290 West Center Street 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Telephone (801)375-2500 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS i 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL , 1 
FACTS 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
POINT II 
POINT III 
POINT IV 
THE DISTRICT COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION 
OVER THE ACTION 4 
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT 
BASIS TO FIND A CONTRACT FOR $1.00 PER HEAD 
PER DAY 7 
PLAINTIFF WAS NOT ENTITLED TO CHARGE FOR 
CARE OF THE CATTLE AFTER APRIL 8, 1983 . . . . 
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING JUDGMENT TO 
PLAINTIFF BECAUSE THE UNCONTROVERTED EVIDENCE 
AT TRIAL ESTABLISHED THAT PLAINTIFF HAD 
BREACHED THE CONTRACT . . . . 
POINT V 
POINT VI 
POINT VII 
CONCLUSION 
DEFENDANT IS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOfc PLAINTIFF'S 
HAY DAMAGE 
PLAINTIFF DID NOT SEEK AND THE COURT DID 
NOT AWARD INTEREST 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW BRAD NEIL 
CARLYLE TO TESTIFY AS AN EXPERT WITNESS . . . . 
10 
12 
14 
14 
15 
STATUTES CITED 
28 U.S.C. §1471 5,6 
CASES CITED 
State Finance Company v. Morrow, 
216 F.2d 676 (10th Cir. 1954). . . 5 
Stafos v. Jarvis, 
477 F.2d 369 (10th Cir. 1973) . . 5 
In re Peters, 
266 F. Supp. 742 (D. Utah 1967) 
In re Burns, 
357 F. Supp. 176 (D. Kan. 1972) 
Basso v. Utah Power and Light Co., 
495 F.2d 906 (10th Cir. 1974) 
First State Bank and Trust Co. v. Sand Spr 
528 F.2d 350 (10th Cir. 1976) 
Thomas v. District of Colombia, 
82 F.R.D. 93 (D.D.C. 1979) 
Utah Department of Business Regulation v. 
Commission, 
602 P.2d 696 (Utah 1979) 
Fillmore City v. Reeve, 
571 P.2d 1316 (Utah 1977) 
Turner v. Dewbre, 
530 P.2d 144 (Ok. 1974) 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES FITZGERALD, 
Plaintiff-
Respondent 
v. 
GALE CRITCHFIELD, 
Defendant-
Appellant . 
Case NJD. 20028 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action brought to recover monies for the 
feeding of cattle and a counterclaim to recover for cattle 
injured or killed. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COUJ^ T 
This case was tried to the Honorable Robert J. Bullock 
of the Fourth District Court siting without a jury. The Court 
decided in favor of plaintiff and against defendant on both the 
complaint and the counterclaim. Thereafter the Court declined 
to grant defendant's motion to amend the pleadings and 
defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant/appellant seeks a determination by this 
Court that the lower court had no jurisdiction in this matter. 
Failing that, defendant/appellant seeks a reversal of the 
decision of the lower court or at least a modification of 
certain aspects of the same* 
FACTS 
It is undisputed that in late 1982 the parties to this 
action discussed a possible arrangement whereby defendant's 
purebred cattle, together with some cattle carrying purebred 
embryos, would be housed and fed at plaintiff's facilities. 
The major dispute in this case arises as to what happened with 
regard to consumating an agreement. According to plaintiff's 
version, discussions concerning a contract resumed only after 
defendant had delivered a number of head of cattle to 
plaintiff's facilities in the month of December, 1982 and again 
in early January, 1983. Plaintiff claims that after the cattle 
had been there for some time, he contacted defendant and they 
entered into an oral agreement whereby the cattle were to be 
housed at the rate of $1.00 per day per head of cattle. 
(Record at 146.) 
Defendant's version of the facts is that the parties 
discussed housing the cattle based on the rate of $50.00 per 
ton of hay consumed. Defendant claims that this agreement was 
entered into at his home prior to the delivery of the first 
cattle and was reconfirmed at a later time when an installment 
payment was made. (Record at 145-146.) Defendant/appellant 
further claimed that the discussions relative to the $1.00 per 
head of cow per day did not occur until later and centered 
around the possibility of plaintiff/respondent getting paid 
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that sum, assuming he brought his facilities up to standard, 
including putting up decent fencing and cleaning up the barns. 
(Record at 147, 175-176.) Since plaintiff n&ver did that, the 
agreement to pay $1.00 per head per day nevef came into 
existence. 
The number of cattle brought on to Plaintiff 
respondent's property by defendant is basically undisputed. It 
is further undisputed that on or about April 8, 1983, 
defendant/appellant tried to remove his cattle and was 
prohibited by plaintiff/appellant so that he only recovered 
part of his cattle. It is further undisputed that on April 19, 
1983, defendant/appellant, under court order J removed the rest 
of his cattle except for those which he claimed had been so 
scattered initially that they could not be found or those which 
had died during the time they were at plaintiff/respondent's 
facilities. (Record at 178.) 
The first time plaintiff presented al bill to defendant 
for the feeding of the cattle was April 8, 1^83. (Exhibit 1.) 
Prior to that time, plaintiff/respondent had (never submitted 
any type of a formal bill to appellant/defendant. (Record at 
,000.00 deposit, 
monies to 
164.) It is undisputed that, except for a $3{i 
defendant/appellant has not paid any further 
plaintiff/respondent for the feeding of his clattle. 
There is testimony in the record that defendant's 
cattle got through fences which surrounded the area where they 
were to be kept and got into some haystacks where they ate 
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certain quantities of hay. (Record at 153.) The testimony is 
also unrebutted that the place where appellant/defendant's 
cattle were kept was generally unclean with lots of standing 
water and with fences in very poor condition and in general 
need of replacement or repair. (Record at 249-250.) 
Defendant/appellant sought testimony relative to the 
cause of death of certain cattle of defendant/appellant, but 
the court excluded that testimony as not having come from a 
qualified expert witness. (Record at 236-241.) 
It is undisputed that at the time the instant lawsuit 
was brought, plaintiff/respondent had submitted himself to the 
bankruptcy court in Utah in a Chapter 11 filing. It is also 
undisputed that at no time did plaintiff/respondent ever obtain 
a lifting of a stay in order to proceed in the State District 
Court in the instant action or seek the permission of the 
bankruptcy court to employ an attorney on behalf of the trustee 
as required by Title 11, Section 327 United States Code.. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER THE 
ACTION. 
The exclusive jurisdiction of the federal Bankruptcy 
Courts voer matters dealing with a bankrupt's estate cannot be 
conferred upon state courts through waiver or by consent of the 
parties. 
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The burikru: ccy •/oi-.r' :? l^ve exclusive and complete 
jurisuiction .or dii mat:*-/- • » * - . - • • ^ 
connection w^.^ bankruptcy ^a^eb. ~o ^*~ . .
 ;- . -* - :. State 
Finance Company v. 'lorro1.; '- V. d 6 7S ( nth Cir. • 45- :e 
mar i ZL» i ... > , ^ < * . . j :_ :i_; t 
jurisdiction: 
This solicitude rests upon the bcisic design of 
the Bankruptcy Act not only to distribute the 
non-exempt property of the debtor fairly and 
equally among his creditors but to afford the 
debtor a fresh start in life free from debts 
except those which by statute survive the 
discharge. The effectuation of this design ar id 
purpose is a matter of great public interest , and 
to that end the courts of bankruptcy were created 
. • • . Tiiti jurisdiction thus committed is 
exclusively federal in character. Id. at 679, 
/ibj- i L: - J : I a t m g ~ ..o :leariy established 
rule ~hat federal, oankrupccy courts ha/e exclusive subject 
n-.rc "..;;:•:, 
c*cJts ~ uS5u .o, => o tr otdiOS v • J a r v i s
 f -  * . . . ^  ^  / *J ; , x u t /. , • r • 
l'j~ in r e P e t e r s , 2 6 6 h. c: *-. 7 - 7 ^. ^,„^,t - u ^ o / ) ; a n a ::• r-
Burns 5 
Lack , *. o i.^ jo- • /.atcor ; . : L S J . t.on cannot be waived 
an J " iy" i ^  d i c t i ^  i ~* < n n o "*~ ~* ~" ^ ^ vi f - r r 'i 1 u o*"* ~i * ~* *. ' * * - * 
iiiact ,»i stipulation- I]IKK> i. Ku Le 12(1 i) ; > _,L i^e Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, federal :ourrs Lacking subject matter 
j u r i s d i c i t o n w :i 1 ] d :i s: . . . * z . - . L , L - - * . 11 I a !:  
j u r i s d i c t i o i i - . r j , ^ . ^ . ^asso v. Utah Power and Light Co, , 
495 F.2d 906 M O t h •'. • F.. :::3t. Stilts Bank and Trust Co. 
v. Sand S p r i n g r.. ^  .*.- • : . . . v >*"'.? ~ • O t h d r . 1 9 7 6 ) . 
Neither waiver nor consent of the parties can correct this lack 
of jurisdiction- Basso, 495 F.2d 906, 909- Under Rule 12(h) 
(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, even the party 
invoking the court's jurisdiction is not estopped from raising 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction after a trial on the 
merits. Thomas v. District of Colombia 82 F.R.D. 93 (D.D.C. 
1979) 
The Utah Supreme Court has also held that under Rule 
12(h) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, waiver cannot give 
a state court jurisdiction it is otherwise lacking. Utah 
Department of Business Regulation v. Public Service Commission, 
602 P.2d 696 (Utah 1979). 
Respondent did not at any time seek to have the stay 
lifted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1471(d) in order to proceed in the 
state courts. Further, plaintiff/appellant's counsel was 
unaware that such was the case until after the Court decision 
had been entered. (See affidavit of counsel filed with 
appellant's Rule 60(b) motion.) In any case, lack of 
jurisdiction cannot be waived by the parties. 
Plaintiff/respondent had full recourse to the Bankruptcy Court 
to have this matter determined. The asset, if any, rightfully 
belonged in the bankrupt estate. There was no justifiable 
reason and none has been given why this particular asset should 
be treated differently from the other assets of 
plaintiff/respondent being dealt with by the Bankruptcy Court. 
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Since ric permission .; :•= rougr.: a ni none was obtained 
to lirt - - - - . " J '. , ! lie ] H .' 
did rot oota...* juiisa.^iioii ^i^n-. r is l:o plaintiff's claim or 
as tL cne COM;, - •-: - ; ~? - . V ^ r e f o r e , tnis Court should now 
dete ....... . J IL/respondent remains in 
bankruptcy as of this date, this suit/ including the 
counterclaim/ should be appropr i ate 1 y 1 1 an• I] ed i n tha t coi 11: t. 
I- :STR:C7 o^-r 1 -ID ;IO7 ~\\VE SUFFICIENT BASIS 
I 
,v TO FIND ^ ^ " T 
.
+
- : *, n ~ o : .y plaintiff that caly as of January 15, 
1982, and after some 109 head ~ f V-f>- '.•n ' -• -
already delivered to plaintiff o idCLii :i.'.s, «.io J. rnnnract 
agreed to. (Record at 145-14*.. -. ol-iintiff Fitzgerald's 
.-" - •
 4
 • -* - ^
 :.;\ ; are for 
defendant. Cr l^ciii ield' s cattie ro $i pvr nead per day, that 
contract came . n~ ^;:i- + -=in^ _ sometime around Jar .-*' , 
,-i-i. - , i ..-, ^ , -ie other hanu, L ^ U I L - J . 
that there ./as a soeciric acreenenr: c o feed defendant' - cattle 
reacneu * ^  JU X J. O ' 
(Record at 2C*i, ine U M : -n=i; 
-i-ilt: wc;e delivered. 
] : ':*v - ; in December, 1982, 
n * :? I. ,i ',% i I, iM . , ng pure brfed cattle,, w... u 
plaintiff fed through December and part of January does not 
make sense unless there had been some ] ;:i n,d of agreement whereb> 
defenaant would pay plaintiff for caring for and feeding the 
cattle. Since by plaintifffs own admission, there was no 
discussion concerning $1 per head per day until around January 
15# 1983, tnere was no basis for the lower court to have found 
a contract for $1 per head per day retroactive to December 
1982. That conclusion is supported neither by the evidence 
which was before the court, nor by logic. It simply does not 
make sense that the plaintiff would have fed defendant's cattle 
for two months without any kind of agreement at all. Nor does 
it make any sense for defendant to have entrusted his purebred 
cattle to plaintiff without any specific agreement as to their 
care or feed. 
Inasmuch as the facts do not support a $1 per head per 
day contract, the court was not free to interpose such a 
contract. Nor can the court establish its own terms. 
Plaintiff stood on his claimed $1 per head per day contract and 
therefore is not entitled to recover on quantum meruit nor any 
other claimed contract. This is particularly true since there 
was no testimony as to the amount of hay consumed by 
defendant's cattle. To the contrary there was testimony that 
for at least part of the time, defendant's cattle were simply 
put in a field and not fed any hay. (Record at 207.) Even if 
the arrangement was that defendant would pay according to the 
tonage his cattle consumed, plaintiff's case against defendant 
must fail for failure of plaintiff to put on any evidence of 
tonage consumed. 
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• III. PLAINTIFF WAS MOT ENTITLED TO CHARGE FOR CARE OF 
T H E •• ^ :•: * - • - • • - — : : . 
IL J. .-. ^ .uLspuiea tacit, as of April 8, 1983, defendant 
"had made a demand ;";•• ^et r:i of his cattle (Record at 2139.) 
Howe \ . ^ - i t :i f • c a 111 e bey or id Ap r i 1 8,, 19 8 3 in I t i 3 
sacn iiae ns uefendant :ota:i.t: ; 1 bond _o secure che release or. 
* r e ^ a : m.iM cattle. ..ver^id/^ - •; 
utjrenuan: ai f^e rate ',_ i - • -x .r-a,; per .icay iur .^1.1 oat tie 
remainmq on plaintiff's property after A. r i. I 8, 1983. 
reached a*i dcnje.ne:n .:. : * .. * :n . . . i5sur:ing thai: -.he 
3~ p<- * a-ad p^ r" ia,r '^n^^ac* ' ~ effect- for the period ..p t :> 
/•; '•::. .iLo ...e^d;,' ad clearly renounced 
the •;; jinrdc-, :.i- terms of wnich were unspecified as 
mdicdiiun o- .:ie penija 01 c 1 I:.*J ' ne o_nt^iCt would run. 
Therefore, win1'. de'rend-r" t demanded all ' ais cattle from 
£,..1.;.. .,> . ^t :i:iea pat t . . . jiendant's cattle, 
plaintiff was n : en;i* .- : thereafter )ntinue feeding those 
cattle based on contract. 
P1 aint i f f retaine u ac- 1 ^ nuan.t .; cattle to secure 
paymen 1 for t:ii existing feed bill. (Record at ?:* . However, 
evei. 1 <--,:.
 r . - _ _ t _ -;-,.-.. . -\t 
a bill to defendant prior to April 8, X98J* (Record at 164. 
See Exhibit 1.) Therefore, to the extent that plaintiff 
retained defendant's cattle beyond April 8, 1983, plaintiff did 
so at his own risk. 
According to plaintiff's testimony, as of April 8, 
1983, the amount of the feed bill was $8,926-50. Therefore, 
the lower court was in error in awarding the additional $1,260 
based on the contract for the period beyond. 
IV. THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING JUDGMENT TO PLAINTIFF 
BECAUSE THE UNCONTROVERTED EVIDENCE AT TRIAL ESTABLISHED THAT 
PLAINTIFF HAD BREACHED THE CONTRACT. 
Even assuming that the contract which existed between 
plaintiff and defendant was the contract which the plaintiff 
described, the court improperly held for the plaintiff as tne 
uncontroverted evidence at trial established that plaintiff had 
breached the contract. 
As to the terms of the contract which plaintiff 
alleged to have existed, plaintiff testified as follows: 
Question: And what were you supposed to do in 
return for the dollar a day? 
Answer: Well, I was supposed to feed his cows. 
I was supposed to help the veterinarian from Utah 
State Pregnancy check them. I was supposed to 
calve them. I was supposed to do veterinary work 
on them. Just generally maintain his cows for 
him. (Record 146-147.) 
At trial Brad Carlyle testified that he occasion to 
observe defendant's cattle on the Fitzgerald property and 
further testified that they were dirty most of the time and had 
a lot of bad feed in front of them. (Record at 238.) At the 
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trial , Mr. Harrision, counsel to: pl.i:.i_:Zf stipulated tiia 
T e r r y B i r d w * i i : i : a 1 1 e d H * -' -
Mr. Bird woulu L e s m y cnat ue w is responsible 
for the care of the cattle during the time that 
they were at the Fitzgerald property under the 
direction, of Gale Critchfield; that is to say 
that he was employed by Gale Critchfield; that 
the fences were constantly down, that he had the 
• . responsibility of bringing those cattle in, and 
was constantly bringing those cattle back in; 
that the place was a mess; that during the time 
he was there he personally witnessed two calves 
dying of the cattle that belonged to Mr• 
Critchfield which he attributed to the filthir less 
of the place, and that the cattle w^re not fed 
enough. (Record at 247.) 
Under cross-examination, when asked to give his 
op i n i J t i a s t : wl I^ 11 Ie c a ] v e s d i e d, Mr . B i r d t e s t i £ i e d a s 
follows: 
They were in the corrals where tl ley couldn't get 
anyplace that was, tried to lay down• There was 
no place for the cattle to lay down with 
bedding. In other words, they were in maybe two 
or three inches of "water. And a young calf can't 
live laying that w a y• Th ey c an't st a nd u p 
f ore^ rer . 
Then they moved them up the hill. And when they 
got them out of the corral, I just imagine we had 
a problem with scour. Right directly after that 
there was quite,, I mentioned to Clair, you could 
look out on the hill ctnd you could Stee white 
droppings from the calves. In other1 words 
they've got an internal problem. 
And another reason, tl lat the water they had to 
drink when they got out there was coming directly 
out of the corrals. There was no fresh drinking 
water when they got out. They were drinking out 
of trie cesspool, is where the cows aot their 
waier. (Record at 249-250.) 
* 1 s r from the uncontradicted tes- ::i • * •' 
Cdli. l«.j .. ; u : ^ ^ ^ i ( - kept on the property of p l a i n c m . .vdj 
in corrals which had two to three inches of water, cnat th 
were given inadequate feed and were not provided with fresh 
water, therefore requiring the cows to drink the water that 
they were standing. Such conditions were clearly a breach of 
the contract between the plaintiff and defendant as described 
by the plaintiff. 
V. DEFENDANT IS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR PLAINTIFF'S HAY 
DAMAGE. 
Plaintiff presented at court, a listing of all of his 
damages in the amount of $11,367.50. That figure, according to 
plaintiff's calculation contained the specific amount of $1,200 
for damage to the hay stack supposedly caused by defendant's 
cattle who apparently were able to get out of the fenced-in 
corrals and eat and trample down hay which was in a haystack. 
This figure, however, was improperly included in the amount of 
the judgment for two reasons. First it was not included by the 
judge himself in his decision in the case, and second, any hay 
the cattle ate was the responsibility of plaintiff. 
At the conclusion of the trial, the court made a 
pronouncement of the judgment as follows: 
This is a factual preponderance of the 
evidence case. There doesn't seem to be any real 
dispute concerning the law that's applicable. 
And the Court has to find the facts on the same 
basis that a jury would nave to find the facts: 
that is, preponderance of the evidence; it isn't 
beyond a reasonable doubt. And when I do that I 
have to say this: That there appears to be at 
this time a misunderstanding as to the price to 
be paid for the feedings; but looking at the 
evidence overall that was produced by both sides, 
I conclude that there was an agreement for the 
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payment of one-dollar-per-day per "head. Further, 
I have to conclude that the evidence is too 
speculative to establish any counterclaim against 
the plaintiff. -uvi, :_nerefore, awaird judgment in 
favor of the plaintiff and against defendant in 
the sum of &11.T67.50 plus costs, 
(RecorJ v. 2 
,_ ^  c u t> ^  
h iV'= ^  
:lothv?a was said about damages ~': 
ill* it : ision of -:..-e a--^ u: 
was tnat the ii _;.er head per aay contract was in effect, Oi i 
i:hat oasis, n w a o ir."r '"-rr for tne fin< 3 ; •. : .~i * > •-c--f 1 ect any 
amount as a damage 1 : ^ 
If, ":..; plaint, iff nas alleged, he is entitled " ? S^ 
head per day i - ; .^  .*....:-.' 
cattle. The 'lootinicn^; ,;as clear chat ohintifi's fences were 
r
r; " we e—aoe oi cattie 
':er 
broken down eis^-y a 
1: le went Ji;--;n f ,:ues such that . . I <~Z l_ ---' U X J 
feed on plaintiff's haystack, their escape was the 
respoasioi ' ' • ' --.-..
 r 
any case the i^sponsioiiiiy oi piaintilr. Therefore; :J caarge 
defendant >0i 
ea;;s to 
a o 
is an cviht^ra1 ,v^arqe would fl 
c > . laintir; 
impos • Piaiir.ir. mmse-:: outlined his uuties w: ch reg 
defendant ls c. A . ' Kacoru at J.VD-176; tl :ie -*- ^  " ^ •-•<: : -
a. ,-_g _~ is ^i^.Liarji'o responsibility -. x
 3 indeed his own. 
Therefore, Ka - :-.--*! Cor 3amaves tc hay should be struck from 
VI. PLAINTIFF DID NOT SEEK AND THE COURT DID NOT 
AWARD INTEREST. 
The complaint did not ask for prejudgment interest. 
The pronouncement of the judge did not award prejudgment 
interest. Therefore, it was improper for prejudgment interest 
to be added onto the award. 
VII. THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW BRAD NEIL 
CARLYLE TO TESTIFY AS AN EXPERT WITNESS. 
At the trial after Mr. Carlyle testifying that he had 
observed the conditions in which defendants cattle were kept/ 
defendant's attorney asked Mr. Carlyle the following question: 
"And in your experience, were the cattle getting enough food?" 
This question was objected to, and the court sustained 
objection on the basis that Mr. Carlyle had not been qualified 
as an expert witness. (Record at 239-240.) Mr. Carlyle 
thereafter testified that he was born and raised on a dairy 
farm and that he had been involved with the feeding of cattle 
all of his life. Mr. Carlyle testified that he was 24 years of 
age and had started feeding cattle as soon as he was old enough 
to feed a calf on a bottle. Mr. Carlyle further testified that 
he was in charge of the feeding operation on his father's dairy 
farm. (Record at 102-103.) The court, however, still refused 
to allow Mr. Carlyle to answer the question concerning whether 
the cattle were receiving enough feed. The court stated as 
follows: 
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He hasn't been qualified. Based upon the 
experience he's had and related specifically to 
that -- specifically, I guess this jaan knows a 
lot about cattle; but to answer thofee specific 
questions in a court of law, I do not think he's 
qualified under our rules as an expert, (Record 
at 241.) 
It is exactly the fact that the man knows a lot about cows that 
would qualify him as an expert in this case. In the case of 
Fillmore City v. Reeve, 571 P.2d 1316 (Utah 1977) this court 
held concerning the qualification of expert witnesses that 
The basic rules are: That if the witness has 
specialized knowledge in the field to the extent 
that his testimony can be helpful to the jury on 
matters with which lay persons are not familiar, 
his testimony can be received as an expert; . . . 
Formal education in the area of expertise is not 
necessary. Turner v. Dewbre, 530 P.2d 144 (Ok. 1974). 
Clearly an individual raised on a dairy farm and who 
has the responsibility for feeding cattle on that dairy farm 
should have sufficient qualifications to testify as an expert 
as to whether certain cows which he observed [were receiving 
sufficient feed. 
e testimony of Mr. 
re receiving 
in putting on its 
lof the trial court 
The refusal of the court to allow to 
Carlyle on the issue of whether the cattle we 
sufficient feed greatly impeded the defendant 
counterclaim. For this reason, the decision 
should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
This is a case which never should hak/e been tried by 
District Judge. Plaintiff's counsel should have recognized 
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that if he wished to bring it before the District Court he 
should first obtain permission from the Bankruptcy Court. 
Failing that permission the matter should have been tried in 
the Bankruptcy Court. Jurisdiction is not a matter of which 
the parties can waive, and therefore, the case should be 
dismissed. There is no statute of limitations which has run 
inasmuch as this is a claim in contract occuring in 1983, so 
there is no prejudice to plaintiff. 
If the matter was properly before the court, then 
plaintiff did not establish his contract case and failed to put 
on testimony as to a claim of the quantum meruit or support the 
contract which was testified to by the defendant. However, 
even in that case, plaintiff severely breached the contract by 
reason of his failure to properly care for defendant's cattle 
to allow many of the to die and otherwise not give them the 
kind of care and treatment that the were suppose to receive. 
It was improper of the lower court to deny defendant the right 
to put on Mr. Carlyle as an expert to testify as to the poor 
care of the cattle and specifically as to the cause of death to 
some of the cattle. Therefore, the court finds that the lower 
court had jurisdiction in this matter should be remanded for 
retrial as to defendant's counterclaim. In any case, the 
judgment itself cannot stand in its present form because it 
includes items which are improperly added. 
Respectfully submitted. 
DATED this n° f December, 1984, 
KESLER & RUST 
C 
/Josegrh C. Rust 
Attorneys for Gale Critchfield 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby declare that I caused to b^ mailed two true 
and correct copies of the foregoing APPELLANT1S BRIEF in Civil 
No. 20028, postage prepaid, this 17th day of(December, 1984, to 
Brian C. Harrison 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent 
290 West Center 
Provo, Utah 84601 
2246r 
-17-
